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Social conflicts, changing identities and everyday strategies of 
survival in Macedonia on the eve of the collapse of Ottoman central 
power (1903-1912) Part 2. 
 
The present study focuses on the period after the Ilinden uprising until the outbreak of the 
Balkan Wars, and aims to identify certain social dividing lines, fractures and motivations that 
accelerated the escalation of everyday violence.1 Part 1 focused on the territorial and 
cultural patterns of violence, specific and general motives, the contribution of foreign 
penetration (including both the attempts of powers to settle the question and the 
competition of neighboring small states) and local traditions (customs law) to the nature and 
extent of violence.2 Goals of Part 2. include the identification of some microsocial strategies 
on family and community level as responses to local coercion and government repressions. 
From methodological aspects a combination of Austrian and Bulgarian archival sources (a 
comparison of data obtained from independent observers and participants of events) can be 
promising in order to avoid one-sidedness and partiality, while the re-interpretation of some 
sources using a comparative and economic approach could also be edifying for the reader, 
since even the different terminolgy in Austrian and Bulgarian documents reflects the 
differences in interpreting the events.3 
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 Another goal of this study is to estimate the role of personal interests and economic reasons in 
choosing/changing an identity - beyond sentiments and ideals. In the second part (not published here) we also 
aimed to reason the changes in the support-policy of neighboring Small States, including the rentability and its 
local acceptance in a period, when the selection of an identity meant not only advantages any more, but 
imposed threats as well. 
3
 It is important to note, that the word „Bulgarian” is not equivalent with „Exarchist” in Austrian documents 
(ÖHHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Rappaport to Pallavicini, 21.03.1907., No.330, Beilage No.26, 5. See also the map of 
Kral consul, from 1903, in Nachlass Szapáry, ÖHHStA. Cited also by Toleva, Teodora, Vliyanieto na Avstro-
Ungariya za sazdavaneto na Albanska naciya 1896-1906. Sofia, Ciela, 2012. 540-544. maps). Contrary to this, in 
the reports of the Bulgarian consul in Skopje the term Bulgarian equals with exarchist. The word ’Bulgarian’ 
instead of ’exarchist’ often occurs even in exarchist ecclesiastic documents. See: ЦДА, ф. 331k. oп. 1. a.e. 309. 
л. 31. In Bitola for example: ’Bulgarian school’, ’Bulgarian church’. There were even Patriarchist Bulgarian 
villages according to Bulgarian sources (some of them were converted by Serbian propaganda, some were not 
affected). 
 Strategies of the Ottoman government, the neighboring states and the 
local population  
 
 
As the present study does not aim to analyse all social fault lines within the nationalities of 
the Sanjak of Skopje, in the following lines the behaviour of only four communities is going 
to be discussed. The first is the activity of the Young Turks in power, the second is strategy of 
Serb communities as minorities in the sanjak, the third is the support policy of Bulgaria 
toward Macedonia (and against Serbia) and the fourth is the response of local (mainly 
exarchist) communities to the socio-economic developments in Macedonia.4 
Emigration as a social strategy, a response to the deteriorating circumstances was 
partly driven by the violence-wave, partly by the shortage of incomes. According to the 
selected sources of Austro-Hungarian archival documents the political situation in Kosovo 
vilaet was subordinate as a driving force, economic situation had larger effect on migration 
processes. The latent economic problems were also key elements in the timing of the Ilinden 
uprising earlier in 1903 (see below). Economic and political problems were inseparable as we 
pointed out in Part I, but the Ottoman state tried to find solutions only for the latter, which 
might reason her failure.  
The USA became a target destination for inhabitants of Kosovo vilaet only after 1906, 
prior to this most of the early migrants moved traditionally to other regions of the Ottoman 
Empire as season-workers or to neighboring states (pečalbari), where they were often 
infected by or fell victim to nationalism (see later).5 The emergence of the USA as a new 
destination in a landlocked country clearly indicates the desperate situation of inhabitants. 
Most of the emigrants were catholic or orthodox men, stemming from the uneducated 
lower classes. Qualification (tailor, stonemason) hardly had any of them. Most of them were 
agricultural labourers working for daily wages almost on constant motion for years. As 
employment possibilities shrank many decided to settle overseas to earn ‘2 dollars daily’,6 
which is pretty much compared to their earnings (around 2 francs daily) in the Ottoman 
Empire. Another tendency is, that expatriots stemmed mainly from administrative centers, 
where agencies for emigration also worked (Skopje, Tetovo, Lipljan), or from settlements 
along railroads. The tendency, that mainly men left their place of living clearly enlightens, 
that their emigration should be considered temporary, and not permanent, inspired by 
mainly employment. From Kosovo vilaet, emigrants left Europe from Fiume (Rijeka) and 
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 ÖHHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02. 1909., No.19/pol, 8. 
Hamburg (that’s why Austrian sources provide information on this topic). The procedure cost 
around 500 francs (equal almost to the yearly wage of an untrained industrial worker or a 
day-labourer in agriculture).7  
This social strategy – including forced and unforced migration – had long-term 
economic and ethnic consequences. The shortage of manpower resulted in the escalation of 
violence as no one was to defend the households left without adult men. The originally 
cheap Macedonian labour wages (in Bulgaria it was above 2 francs daily in agriculture) were 
also increasing, which endangered the rentability of market-oriented large chiflik-estates. 
These were partly based on cheap labour force, partly on high retail prices of wheat prior to 
1873/78. But after Argentina, Russia and the USA had appeared in western markets as wheat 
exporters, prices began to fall. The landlords tried to exert pressure on the producers to earn 
profit, but this generated the above described mass migration. Finally, many landowners 
were forced to sell the land to the peasants, but these often lacked real purchase power, 
and needed credit to purchase land. This amount of money could be provided by private 
persons (this often meant usury, thus indebtedness) or could be obtained from the agents of 
small states using money as an instrument for nationalistic propaganda. As the case of Pusta 
Bresnica shows below8 tenants tended to buy the landowners’ land using foreign loans and 
in return they offered their loyalty to the small states allocating credit also for this purpose 
(beyond creating schools, building churches). 
In order to halt the aformentioned unfavourable phenomena the officials and 
landlords of Kriva Palanka made several efforts to bring Moslem Albanian settlers from the 
western part of the vilaet, substituting the emigrants. The presence of Moslem Albanians in 
Kočani can be explained by this fact too. Unfortunately, this decision deteriorated public 
security further. It is important to emphasize, that in the process of discouraging peasants, 
who finally decided to emigrate not only economic processes played crucial role, but the 
frequent harassment of agitators and bands of Slavic (local, Serbian or Bulgarian) origin, who 
pillaged this region, and intimidated landlords as well.9 Their activity was focusing on 
recruiting from peasants and destroying the harvest, thus weakening the economic basis of 
the ottoman ruling class.10 But nevertheless, these raids also ruined the economic basis of 
peasantry as the crop was usually shared 50-50% between the tenant and landlord on 
chiflik-estates. 
It became evident by the turn of the century that Macedonia was unable to supply 
more people at the given technical level without dramatic (positive) changes in internal 
conditions. Exports were stagnating, while crop imports grew from zero to 30 thousand tons 
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yearly between 1895-1905.11 While in the 1850s 20-25% of the crop per household was 
exported, it fell back to 5% in 1900. That time Macedonia was in the phase of 
reindustrialisation, silk export was increasing compared to crops. The obsolete economic 
structure of the region is marked by the fact, that in the Kosova vilaet 50% of the central 
income still stemmed from the tithe, while in the more industrialized Saloniki vilaet and 
Monastir this fell to 25-30%.12 Similar values characterised Bulgaria – but prior to 1878! 
Compared to the significance of land revenues, that were increasing, crop production was 
stagnating and price-index was decreasing. As the number of agricultural workers were also 
decreasing, these unfavourable conditions for the budget could only be balanced by the 
increase of per capita tithe-revenues (Table 1). This 70% increase of per capita tax-burden 
within 10 years was the main reason for the increase in central revenues and it also 
contributed to the outbreak of the Ilinden-uprising.13 Per capita tithe was similar to that of in 
N-Bulgaria prior to the independence (including the tax-rate over 12%), but circumstances 
were different: the peasants of Macedonia were living mostly in chifliks and had to face with 
other obligations toward the landlord, while N-Bulgaria was dominated by free-estates in a 
period of crop-conjuncture. 
 
Table 1. Central income from tithe in Macedonia between 1890-1903  
Year 
Tax 
income in 
million 
piastres 
Rural 
population 
in million 
Tithe 
per 
capita 
in 
piastres 
Crop 
price 
index 
Tax-
burden 
index  
Crop 
production 
in million 
tons 
Crop 
production 
per rural 
person in 
tons 
Index 
of tax-
burden 
per 
capita 
1888-
1890 41.5  2.04  20 100 100 1.1 0.5 100 
1901-
1903 58.3  1.7  34 85 200 1 0.6 170 
Akarli, A.: Growth and retardation in Ottoman Macedonia 1880-1910. In: Pamuk, Sevket  - 
Williamson, J.G. (eds.): The Mediterranean Response to Globalisation before 1950. Routledge, 2000. p. 121.  
In Bulgaria (in  1866) 27 piasters, in 1867 34 piastres per person were calculated during the crop-conjuncture 
 
To have a better understanding on the economic conditions in the region after 1908 
(and thus on its consequences for the society), we have to go back in time to analyze the 
attempts of the reorganization of Macedonia after the Ilinden-uprising. Beyond the 
restoration of public order (which was quite unsuccessful as proved in Part I) other efforts of 
the international mission between 1903-1907 are also worth an analysis, as it was originally 
planned more than a simple reorganisation of the gendarmerie. The official stance of 
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 The Ilinden-uprising was considered a ’Bulgarian’ uprising by Austrian diplomats. Austrian diplomats wrote 
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Austria-Hungary and Russia as supervising Powers was that their mission is to promote self-
governance (this was the first case, when Powers decided to promote the realization of such 
goals, furthermore it was the first joint operation for peace in Europe), to establish modern 
administration, and to implement a new taxation system in order to restore the economic 
viability of the European provinces. The introduction of a modern taxation system 
admittedly targeted to relieve population from the heavy tax-burden (it was over 12%,14 
while this was around 10% in the neighboring Bulgaria, representing an other pull-factor), 
parallel with the increase of central revenues. So, there was a general worsening of 
economic conditions in Macedonia compared to Bulgaria including both economic output 
and per capita taxes. 
According to Powers the spread of violence was partly the result of the abundance of 
Albanian paramilitary troops that participated in sanctioning the Ilinden uprising.15 These 
četas persisted and acted later as well as auxiliary troops of Ottoman authorities, when the 
latter were unable or unwilling to intervene into the course of events. Therefore Powers 
insisted on that the proportion of Christians in the gendarmerie should be settled according 
to their proportion in the population instead of the general 20% prescribed by the original 
Ottoman plans. The involvement of local people at gardes champetres (militia) was a new 
and welcomed element, but the Sublime Porte raised objection several times to the 
presence of foreign officers. Unfortunately, not only the reform of the gendarmerie, but also 
the introduction of a new taxation system failed due to several factors. The number of 
gendarmerie never exceeded 80% of the proposed, such as the amount of collected taxes 
never exceeded 75-80% of the original plans,16 and the number of policemen was not higher 
than in territories with traditional gendarmerie. 
 
Table 2. Theoretical and real number of gendarmerie in reformed and intact areas 
Reformed 
gendarmerie Theoretical number Real number 
sanjak officer 1st class 2nd class (local) mounted total officer 1st class 
2nd class 
(local) mounted total 
Saloniki 46 1121 186 195 1502 40 781 141 173 1095 
Seres 14 374 34 79 487 15 292 33 70 395 
Drama 10 154 65 42 261 9 123 49 45 217 
Monastir-
Kastoria 31 811 73 147 1031 27 612 84 138 834 
Skopje 32 800 157 87 1044 24 540 153 77 770 
Altogether 133 260 515 550 4235 115 2348 460 503 3311 
 
 Traditional 
gendarmerie 
 
Theoretical number Real number 
 kaza officer infantry mounted altogether officer infantry mounted altogether 
Gürid 11 242 64 306 10 230 58 288 
Elbassan 8 201 32 233 10 197 32 229 
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 Diplomatische Aktenstücke …  9.  Nr. 5. 04.02.1903. Calice to Goluchowski 
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 Diplomatische Aktenstücke …  152-154. 28.02.1906. Nr. 153.  
Dibra 11 247 28 275 15 227 27 251 
Serfidzse 23 475 98 573 23 441 93 534 
Pristina 23 509 73 582 23 488 73 561 
Sjenica 11 231 73 304 10 226 72 298 
Ipek 14 309 44 353 10 284 43 327 
Prizren 17 354 54 408 15 337 51 388 
Total 118 2568 466 3034 116 2427 449 2876 
 
Even diplomats were short-sighted or ill-informed. Contrary to the analysed statistics 
in Part I, published reports in 1905 wrote about successes. The then military attaché of 
Austria-Hungary, Giesl reported to Calice, ambassador at Constantinople, that Bulgarian 
bands were calmed down including the IMRO and Tsonchevists as well. Although he 
mentioned a clash between Serbian and Bulgarian bands (13, June, Petralica-Egripalanka and 
17 June, Belan-Kumanovo), this was put down by official Ottoman forces. The Bulgarian 
border was silent, as he wrote (no trespassing of foreign agitators or troops was observed). 
He had seemingly no knowledge either on the other Austrian statistics on everyday violence 
or on the conscription of weapons of IMRO from 1906. The above mentioned are good 
examples of the limited interaction between the different organizations of Austria-Hungary. 
Since military attachés were subordinated to Conrad von Hötzendorf, they relied on 
different information sources and thus were not aware of all events.17  
The new tax-system was based on fixed amounts replacing the iltizam system. 1 
dönüm land in the Skopski sanjak (750-900 m2) has been charged with 1.5-8 piastres yearly 
for 5 years, with the exception of Keremetlik that paid 15 piastres (3 francs) yearly.18 
According to this newly introduced system the average tithe in the Monastir kaza fell from 
3.4 million piastres between 1899-1904 to 2.4 million piastres (collected with 87% 
effectiveness), in the Skopje and Saloniki kaza it remained 1.3-1.3 million piastres 
respectively collected at 75% efficiency. Contrary to these efforts in 1905-1906 still more 
than 2500 men left the Monastir kaza, while in the previous year only 1000, indicating the 
instability of the situation. 
One may come to the conclusion, that the burdens of peasantry were decreasing. 
Bulgarian tithe was 130-170 piastres per family in 1866-1867 compared to the 100 in 1864, 
while in Macedona it was 80-120 piastres per family, decreasing from 34 per capita to 13-21 
piastres. But the vilaet budgets made it clear that the situation was not ameliorating: 
tigether with the arrears collected, there was no significant difference between the situation 
in Bulgaria prior to 1878 and Macedonia (20-28 piastres per capita). Tithe revenues fell only 
with 3 million between 1903-1906 (from 58 million to 55 million). However the Powers were 
succesful since yearly total income of the 3 vilaets of Macedonia did not decrease between 
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1903-1906 and ranged up to 190 million piastres in 1905/1906, unfortunately the expenses 
were greater, between 253 and 267 million, creating a negative balance. While earlier the 
center was able to finance its needs from the incomes of the periphery (that was the main 
cause of protests in Bulgaria prior to 1878), after the turn of the century it was the periphery 
sucking money from the central government. The deficit was due to the high military 
expenses, that constituted 50% of the expenses, while the share of civil expenditures 
reached only 31%. Per capita tax revenues were still not lower, than in Bulgaria (incresing 
from 260-380 piasters altogether per family between 1864-1867) (Table 3).  
Although the economic performance of the two regions were nearly the same (150 
million piastres tax for Tuna vilaet with 2.2 million inhabitants and 190 million piastres for 
the 3 million inhabitants of the 3 Macedonian vilaets) the main difference was (beyond the 
passed 30 years) that Bulgaria in the 1860s enjoyed the advantages of a crop conjuncture 
and was characterized with more favourable estate conditions. Macedonia was overloaded. 
Beyond the religious and ethnic diversity of the area the economic situation was another 
reason why the Macedonian question could not be solved by peaceful propaganda through 
religion or education: the population was looking for the alternatives which would solve 
their everyday social and economic problems and was ready to exploit its fluid and 
amorphous national consciousness in order to secure its material interests. 
 
Table 3. Tithe and total income in million piaster in Macedonia 
 
Income 
from tithe 
in 1903/4  
Income 
from tithe 
in 1906 
Income from tithe 
 per person, per family 
Income from 
arrears (1903) 
Income from 
arrears (1905) 
Monastir 12.3 11.1 13 and 78 piastres 7 4.3 
Kosovo 23.4 22.3 21 and 120 piastres 5.3 4.3 
Saloniki 21 20.3 21 and 120 piastres 3 2.9 
 
Expenses, 1905/1906,  
 million piaster 
Civil 
expenses 
Military 
expenses Affectation Altogether 
Saloniki 33.3 50.2 26 109.5 
Kosovo 27.1 55.6 1,6 84.3 
Monastir 24 42 7.8 74 
Total 84.5 148 35.4 268 
Total, previous year 74.5 143 36 254 
     
Income, 1905/1906  
million piaster Tax 
Tax arrear 
collected Altogether 
Population and tax 
per capita and per 
family (6 persons) 
Saloniki 70 7.8 77.9 1.1 million: 63 piastres, 350 piastres 
Kosovo 49 7.9 56.9 1 million: 50 piastres, 300 piastres 
Monastir 42 8.4 50.8 0.95 million: 44 piastres, 250 piastres 
Total 161.4 24.2 185.6 50 piastres, 300 piastres 
Collected and calculated from: K. u K. Ministerium des Äussern.  Diplomatische Aktenstücke über 
die Reformaktion in Mazedonien 1902-1906.  166-174. Nr. 160. 29.04.1906. 
 
*** 
After the failure of Powers (1903-1908), the Young Turk (CUP, Committee of Union and 
Progress) revolution tried to resolve the problems. One of the remarkable changes of these 
times was that the already existing nationality concerns had become by far the most 
dominant source of conflict (beyond economic and social problems). Though the 
denominational identity in some cases still manifested both in the Christian and the Moslem 
communities (eg. after an attack on a shrine, or following the funeral of a prominent leader 
of the irregular troops),19 it was a more common practice after 1908 that the consular 
reports discussed the received information in terms of nationalities (Bulgarian, Serbian, 
Albanian).  
As a consequence of the revolution of the CUP, the leadership in charge of vilaets 
transformed. Contrary to the fact, that old and experienced bureaucrats were (re)placed to 
distant parts of the Empire, in the first few months following the 1908 Young Turk revolution 
this south-eastern part of Kosovo vilaet remained relatively calm. What made it possible was 
not so much the talent and aptitude of the new Young Turk officials, as the merit of Pasha 
Hadi, the energetic new governor.20 In the Skopje sanjak he maintained peace by creating his 
own local intelligence network. He aimed to collect compromising information on all 
potential members of the opposition (clerics, clerks, teachers, journalists, četa leaders, 
national clubs, etc.). When minor incidents occured, he used these information to arrest 
those people and thus to prevent major demonstrations (either against the state or against 
another community).21 However, as he made no attempt to solve real problems, like 
reducing social tensions and neglected relevant political and economic issues, he had no 
chance to prevent the eventual collapse of the state power in the region.  
In 1909 4 national clubs were operating in Skopje: the Serb, the Bulgarian, the Young 
Turk and the Albanian. The first two represented the radical nationalism of the neighboring 
states, the latter two were in tight relations due to personal matches and overlaps. During 
the autumn of 1909, the leadership of the vilaet attempted to create a civil supranational 
’Ottoman Club’ club, that would incorporate anybody willing to cooperate with the CUP, 
thus the club could serve as a means communication between CUP and radical national 
associations. The goal was to demonstrate and promote the possibilities of rapprochment 
between the nationalities and central authorities, furthermore it could serve as an 
instrument to hinder propaganda against the government.22 Although among Macedo-
Bulgarians IMRO and the vrhovists had an overwhelming majority in the countryside,23 many 
of the urbanised Bulgarians in Skopje tended to cooperate with the central power.24 The idea 
beyond this plan was the opinion that the key element of restoring security and tolerance in 
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the region was an appeasement with the most radical organisations (Serbs, Bulgarians), 
while the aspirations of peaceful minorities could be neglected,25 since the organisations of 
only these two radical nationalities were able to exert pressure both on irregular troops and 
peaceful organisations.26 The legal background of creating an Ottoman Club was the so-
called ’Ottoman Law’, that pointed out that the empire is constituted only by the Ottoman 
nation (in which every subject or citizen of the state was incorporated), therefore only 
Ottoman associations, clubs could be regarded as legal. Clubs, organised on national basis 
were soon considered illegal and prohibited.27 
The efforts to organise an Ottoman club over nations remained futile. Christian 
national clubs did not want to appease with each other, refused to be organised in a 
supranational organisation and negotiations were delayed by the lack of real local respect to 
the CUP. The lack of trust increased further from 1909, when the central government was 
unable to pay its officials and the gendarmerie in the countryside in time compared to the 
period of supervision of Powers. This resulted not only in the loss of efficiency but of 
influence as well. Central power nearly drifted on the brink of collapse in local centers.28 The 
CUP had to change its tactics to gain success in stabilizing public order. 
 Therefore, as a result of the above mentioned, in the late spring of 1909 the radicals 
of the Young Turk leadership shifted their focus of interest into Moslem policy, inasmuch as 
they became more open towards the religious fanatic urban groups. They initiated secret 
negotiations with the local denominational leaders in secluded mosques. The Young Turks' 
idea was to create a secret Moslem organization modelled on IMRO, with its own regulation, 
which could organize trustworthy and able Moslem men into combat teams after the 
Christian fashion. They planned to store the necessary weapons in the mosques. With this 
step the Young Turks wished to win the allegiance of the fanatic Moslem communities, to 
suppress the moderates within the party and to prepare for an open armed conflict in the 
vilaet, which seemed to be unavoidable for many members.29  
 However, the demands of the rural Moslem landowners needed to be tackled as well. 
Restlessness was on the increase in the Serbian and Bulgarian border kazas primarily, as 
these areas were virtually ruled by irregular troops or by the IMRO, where the tension 
between Moslems and Christians escalated the most.30 The leaders of the sanjak understood 
that the peripheral kazas slipped out of their control, and from the spring of 1909 they 
started to distribute weapons to the Moslems from the army warehouses. This happened 
after the Ottoman beys of the countryside had threatened the military leaders, that unless 
they arm up the Moslems, the beys would raise the Albanians and hire them break into and 
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rob the warehouses.31 The distribution of weapons from military storages did not remain in 
secret – the Bulgarian government officially objected several times to these attempts, which 
the Turks refused to admit.32 
 The opening towards fanatic Moslems and the support of armament of Moslems 
along the border is interesting, since the safety of Moslems in 1908 did not seem to be 
challenged compared to former periods. Even the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not 
have decisive impact on the security of Macedonian Moslems. According to the reports of 
Austrian consuls, the secession of the two provinces had already become an acceptable 
outcome of events within (Macedonian) Moslem communities by 1908. A war with Austria-
Hungary over the provinces did not seem to be irrealistic, but Moslems were convinced that 
an Austrian annexation was still a better solution, than a Serbian one. Moslems in Skopje 
even hoped, that the annexation would create an emigration wave among Bosnian Moslems, 
and new settlers in the Sanjak of Skopje could change the religious proportion in favour of 
the Moslems.33  Beyond the lack of training this policy and the hopes discussed above can 
also explain the hesitation, passivity and the failure of regular soldiers to hinder the outrages 
and pogroms in Štip, 1911. 
The CUP did not elaborate a new policy towards the Albanians in the Sanjak of 
Skopje: Albanian national clubs were considered as attachments, branches of the Young 
Turkish clubs. The CUP continued its policy of assimilation based on the common religion by 
refusing Albanian cultural demands, like the latinized alphabet in 1908.34 But serious 
conflicts between Albanians and Young Turks did not emerge compared to other parts of the 
vilaet.35 And, contrary to Tetovo, Gostivar, Prizren and other regions, where a violent 
religious (Catholic/Orthodox – Moslem) conflict evolved among Albanians (beyond the 
conflicts between nationalities) that had to be tackled with, in this sanjak no major fault lines 
occured within the Albanian society.36 
The CUP-adminsitration of the sanjak was totally powerless regarding the Bulgarian 
question (schooling, bands).37 Leaders only tried either to avoid the escalation of conflicts 
and to keep them within certain frames, or to pesuade local Serbs and tolerant urbanised 
Bulgarian associations against IMRO and vrhovists.38 Since the religious issues were 
interwoven with conflicts between nationalities, the Ottoman adminstration tried to 
regulate the debate over schools and churches through the law on religion, issued on 15 
June, 1910. The law regulated the re-distribution of patriarchist and exarchist ecclesiastic 
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property and schools based on the number of local supporters and proselytes. With this step 
the government hoped to increase public security and trust towards the government and to 
diminish rivalization and atrocities, which were caused by the fact, that since the beginning 
of the 20th century many villages converted to the Exarchate, but ecclesiastic property 
remained in the hands of patriarchist clergy.39 According to the new law it was the 
government’s right to distribute the sum of maintenance for schools between different 
Churches. According to the 3rd arcticle the local church belonged to the community that 
built it, if its proportion did not decrease below 33%. If the proportion decreased below 33% 
the church and the school had to be handed over the community in majority, but the other 
community had the right to erect a new sanctuary. According to the 4th article, in 
settlements with more than one church, churches had to be divided between communities, 
unless the proportion of the smaller one decreased below 33%. If any community converted 
to new religion after the enforcement of this law, they had a right to erect a new building for 
religious purposes, but at their own cost.40 
The content of this law draws our attention on two occasions. First of all, due to the 
ratios mentioned in the text, it is possible to describe ethnic/denominational proportions in 
the Macedonian countryside within villages and thus comparing these with the settlement-
level ethnic map of the Bitola vilaet from 1901– before enforcing the law, a committee 
visited the settlements and conscribed the households based on religion (Table 5).41 
Secondly, owing to this conscription, investigations could be carried on regarding former 
(and forthcoming) abuses, which were formerly usually ignored by the central government 
of the sanjak. Religious communities in minority often complained about reprisals coming 
from the majority. In a Macedo-Bulgarian letter written to Ali Riza, President of the 
Parliament, it turns out, that prior to these reforms, priests assigned to other religious 
communities refused to baptize the children of ’infidels’ or ’secessionists’ or to bury the 
dead in the last 6-7 years. The behavior of these priests challenged ’the most sacred right of 
human beings – pleading for and praising God according to our own customs’.42  
Exarchist priests around Prizren mentioned, that in Kraklinno (Bitolska) on 
31.10.1909. Vasilios Greek vladika closed down the Bulgarian church, although it was 
consecrated by the exarchist Gennadiy in 1878, and the founding ferman gave the church to 
the local exarchist community (in 1910 the village had 53-57 exarchist households and 7 
Greek households, Table 4). The village seceeded from the Patriarchate in 1904, but the 
church was used by patriarchists until the intervention of Havzi pasha. Although the church 
was given to exarchists in 1908, one year later villagers complained once more on 
partriarchists using the church expelling exarchists.  
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In Dihovo 4 exarchists were killed by an andartis četa in 1909 because the 6 Greek 
households vindicated the right to use the local church. Contrary to the great Hellenic 
pressure the number of Grecophile households rose only to 15 by 1910 (when the 
conscription took place), while there were still over 50 exarchist households. 43 
 
Table 4. Religious (ethnic) composition in some villages where atrocities (mentioned in the text) took 
place 
Bitola kaza 
Exarchist 
households 
Patriarchist 
households 
Exarchis 
nufuz 
Patriarchist 
nufuz 
Kraklinno 53 7 354 61 
Dihovo 54 15 394 111 
Kopadurishta 44 20 336 235 
ЦДА, ф. 331k oп. 1. a.e. 309. л. 29. 
 
But scrupulous situations also recurred after the initiation of reforms especially in 
territores where Exarchists remained in minority. Very often Exarchist communities were 
unable to get rid of Grecophil priests (in Southern Macedonia),44 or the majority did not get 
the right to operate the school contrary to the law (Armenohori). In some cases Greeks 
would rather close these institutions, than to hand them over to Exarchist communities 
(Gorničevo) (see Table 6-7). 45 
 
Table 5. Religious (ethnic) distribution of population in the villages of Kostursko seceeded from the 
Patriarchate after 1903, prior to the redistribution of ecclesiastic property in 1910.  
Situation in 
15.05.1910 
Exarchist 
households 
Patriarchist 
households 
Moslem 
households 
Total 
population 
Year of 
secession 
from 
patriarchate 
Number 
of 
churches 
Number of 
schools 
Nestine 32 18 20 420 1910 3 
1 
(Bulgarian) 
Gorjanci 161 170 175 2645 1909 2 2 
Gusilovo 44 8 0 295 1909 1 1 
Kumaničevo 86 24 42 755 1908 3 1 
Starigiani 38 20 0 455 1903 2 1 
Sničani 58 23 0 420 1903 2 1 
Mogila 15 7 0 115 1903 2 no school 
G. Nestram 79 91 0 970 1908 3 1 
D. Nestram 70 150   1320   2 2 
Seligošte 24 14 120 831 1909 1 1 
Rabigošte 12 5 0 97 1909 1 1 exarchist 
Kalebušta 2 58 0 402 1910 2 
1 not 
Bulgarian 
Čuka 3 22 166 1909   1 
1 not 
Bulgarian 
Breznica 110 10 655     1 1 
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Želevo 110 110 ?  1406   
2 (1 
exarchist) 2 
ЦДА, ф. 331k oп. 1. a.e. 309. л. 74-75 and л. 35-38. (bold letters indicate settlements with details of 
situation after the enforcement of new law, see below) 
 
 
Table 6. Disputed churches in Kajlarsko 
Paleor 
(Paleohori?) 90 Christians 50 Moslems 
Exarchist majority with divided 
school 
Embore 
200 Exarchist houses,  
20 Patriarchist 
40 Moslem 
households 
4 churches, 2 greater and the one 
outside the village is Patriarchist 
Lipinci 
(Hassanköj) 
65 Exarchist households, 6 Patriarchist, everybody visits the same church, the priest is 
Greek, village seceeded from the Patriarchate 2 years ago, the government hinders the 
establishment of a school due to the fear of violence and propaganda 
Dorutovo 40-50 houses, all Exarchists except the priest, who is still in charge after the reforms 
ЦДА, ф. 331k oп. 1. a.e. 309. л. 30. 
 
Table 7. Distribution of ecclesiastic and educational properties in Kostursko after the enforcement of 
new law in 1910  
Disputed settlements in Kostursko 
Gorjeni 
the bigger church outside the village becomes Bulgarian46 property, the 
Grekoman majority possesses the main church in the center of the 
settlement and the small one outside the village  
Dolno Kumaničevo 
problem remains unresolved: there is a bigger church in the village and 
a smaller outside the village, but there are only 3 Greek households  
Gorno Kumaničevo the church becomes exarchist property, there are no Greek households 
Olissa 15 Greek households, one church becomes exarchist  
Konomladi 
the great church of the village becomes a Bulgarian property, the 4 
households with 6 Greek nufuz uses the chapel in the cemetery 
Pozdiviša 
the village church becomes a Bulgarian property, the 2 Grekoman 
households uses the chapel in the cemetery   
Breznica 
the old church belongs to Bulgarians, the 11 Greek households with 74 
nufuz may erect a new building 
Želevo the newer church belongs to Bulgarians and one school also 
Staričani 
Bulgarians constituting the majority get the greater church, while 
Greeks get the smaller one outside the village  
Ezerec the church is given to Bulgarians, the Greeks have to build a new one  
Sničani 
the great church belongs to Bulgarians, the Greeks are allowed to build 
a new church 
Čuka 
the Greek majority gets the church, the 2 exarchist household may 
build a new one  
G. Nestram 
the great church is given to Bulgarians, the Greek possess the small one 
outside the village 
D. Nestram the church remains Greek, Bulgarians may establish a new one  
ЦДА, ф. 331k oп. 1. a.e. 309. l. 28. 
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Table 8. Religious distribution of population in Lerinsko, and the distribution of ecclesiastic property 
after the reforms of 1910 
Exarchist Patriarchist households 
Lerin town 180 555 
the church and the school is Greek, Bulgarians may erect a 
new one 
Nered 248 93 
Armenohori 54 40 school and church remains Greek 
Gorničevo 174 9 
small church is given to Bulgarians, the greater is Greek, the 
school is closed down  
Sorovič 57 62 
school and chapel in the cemetery is Greek, Bulgarians may 
establish a new one  
Bač 40 16 the school and the church is given to Greeks 
Srebreno 45 55 the school and the church is Greek 
ЦДА, ф. 331k oп. 1. a.e. 309. л. 31. Contrary to its exarchist character Bač in Albania was the homeland of the 
Serboman ceta leader Pavle (Part I. Table 3) 
 
In order to maintain peace, authorities had also taken steps against the broadening 
activity of the irregular Christian troops. At the end of 1909 the parliament in Istanbul 
legislated a general law to abolish all the irregular troops within the boundaries of the 
Empire. According to the law it was forbidden to set up irregular troops or to keep weapons 
at home. If caught, the četa leaders were to be executed, the četa members to be 
imprisoned. The law also declared the right for the authorities to arrest the wives and the 
children of the četa members.47 These instructions were adopted by the Serbian government 
in 1913 after the occupation of northern Macedonia. 
 Furthermore, the central government decided in 1910 'to handle' the problems of the 
vilaets of Kosovo, Bitola and Shkodra and to collect the weapons with the help of the 
Imperial army. This had many reasons: contrary to the military reforms of the CUP, that 
encouraged Christians to serve in the military forces, the army still remained dominantly 
Moslem of character. Therefore it was considered loyal, while the gendarmerie - much of 
Christian character – was not. The army was ordered to use force if necessary, to disarm the 
civil population. The government also expected the imperial troops to collect the levied 
taxes of that year once again, to abolish all the (illegally operating) national clubs and 
societies in the aboved mentioned vilaets (by arresting people, destroying buildings, burning 
printed products) and to moderate the extremely high rate of the social violence in the 
countryside. The second target of the military action was to prevent a new general Albanian 
revolt, among other things by recruiting soldiers from the Moslem population.48  
 The Imperial army of Torghut Pasha, more than 50.000 men with heavy artillery, 
obeyed the order with the greatest possible violence.49 Besides collecting the weapons, the 
pasha wanted to terrorise the local Christian villagers. The method of the army was simple: 
the military troops surrounded a village, opened fire with the cannons, brutally beat up the 
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terrified inhabitants and carried off the handcuffed men. After these insults, the frightened 
villagers handed over their weapons without resistance. Military forces intended to carry out 
the operation in those months, when the activity of četas was low, therefore these were 
unable either to encourage or to indimidate the population to resist or to flee, and Ottoman 
military forces did not have to confront with paramilitary troops.50  
Carrying out this military action proved to be harder in the border kazas because the 
news of the disarming reached this region faster than the regular troops. Those living along 
the border managed to hide their weapons or they escaped to Bulgaria smuggling the 
weapons as well.51 The Christian inhabitants of the central kazas, the dignitaries of the 
churches protested at the authorities and the foreign consulates against the disarming 
action. They referred to the fact that without their weapons they would be at the mercy of 
the Moslems and they would not be able to defend their villages against the irregular 
Moslem or Christian troops. Their need for weapons – as they argued, because of the 
incapacity of the central government to defend the countryside from intruders or from 
restless local elements – was after all disputable, as very often these weapons were not used 
to resist, but to promote the activity of rebels. Whatever the truth was about the weapons 
spared at home, this situation meant danger for the central government, therefore the 
authorities ignored the complaints. What is more, only because of their complaining, most of 
the complainants risked the revenge either of the authorities or of the paramilitary troops. 
This was the reason why the Bulgarian Pope Vane Zafirov from Orašje (kaza Kumanovo) was 
brutally executed by Hristo Lazarev, a četa-leader from Bulgaria on 9th July, 1910. A 
Bulgarian peasant from Živina (kaza Skopje), Stojce Čaparanski had more luck: though he was 
sentenced to death by the müdir of Konjari he managed to escape abroad.52 
 The success of the disarming action seemed doubtful however even for the 
contemporary witnesses. Official statistics on collected weapons were created only at vilaet 
levels. Approximately 150.000 pieces were collected in Kosovo vilaet till September 1910 
and further 50 thousand was planned to be collected, but sabres are also included in these 
numbers. Half of the collected weapons stemmed from Albanians, half from Slavs. On the 
one hand, according to the Austro-Hungarian consul of Skopje, a remarkable part of the 
collected weapons was useless and old. On the other hand, the inhabitants were able to 
rearm themselves again any time by smuggling weapons, since the borderland has already 
slipped out of control of the Ottoman authorities.53 
  The Bulgarian state considered this disarmament of local population as the 
armament of Moslems. Rumours were hinted, that the collected weapons were distributed 
among Moslem population. Mahmud Sevket Pasha refused these statements and responded 
to the intervention of the Bulgarian state, that those whom the weapons were allotted, were 
indeed soldiers of the reserve class (redif), who were enrolled against the četas. But the 
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Bulgarian government had news from many localities, that the distributed weapons – no 
matter whether they came from military storages or were collected from local people – 
remained in the hands of the Moslem village leaders (mukhtar), and weapons were not 
handed into the military storages after the action had been over.54 
It is noteworthy that the only minority of the sanjak, that did not objected to the 
disarmament, was the Serb. According to the Austro-Hungarian consul in Skopje Serbs had 
two reasons for doing this: they wanted to enjoy advantages regarding religious and 
educational issues in return of their cooperation, and the government in Belgrade did not 
want to create unnecessary conflicts with the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, it is also 
noteworthy, that - through band leaders arriving from Serbia (like Skopjance, see Part I) - 
Belgrade pointed out, that Serbia was ready to supply new weapons, whenever the loyal 
population needed. 55  
 The greatest challenge that needed to be solved by the new Young Turk leadership in 
the sanjak of Skopje was undoubtedly how to cope with the Bulgarian and Serbian conflict. 
To handle the political aspirations that the two nations held against the Empire, to moderate 
the hostility between them or to make compromises that could be acceptable for all parts 
were simply not realistic options.56 
The local policy of the Serbian community in the Sanjak of Skopje was basically 
determined by three conditions.57 1. Within the boundaries of the sanjak the Serbians 
belonged to the smaller nationalities (they made up only 5.5% of the entire population, and 
9.6% of the Christian inhabitants).58 2. The most significant opponents of the Serbian 
national propaganda was the Bulgarian national movement. 3. Considering the fact that the 
greatest problems that had to be dealt with were generated by the Bulgarians, the Serbian 
politicians and the leaders of the Young Turk party naturally became allies. This created a 
cooperation between Serbs and Ottoman administration at local levels too, which 
manifested in local level as well, as the following example confirms this. 
In the neighborhood of Prilep Bulgarian monks in their letter from November, 1909 
complained about the violent expropriation of two monasteries (in Slapč and Zarze) by 
Serbian villagers in 1906. After the coup d’etat of the CUP the state gave back the two 
monasteries to the Exarchate. But since the Serbs expropriated the properties, lands etc. of 
these monasteries, and the surrounding villages (Dabnica and Nebregovo) opposed to 
become exarchist and to support the monasteries with food,59 the clergy had to ask for help 
from the Bulgarian state (for 100 Turkish lira = 2000 francs). The money was used to hire 
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Albanians to collect the harvest from lands once belonging to the monasteries, then under 
cultivation by Serbian peasants. As a response, the Serbs also asked for armed assistance 
and resisted. The authorities of the sanjak and vilaet were unwilling to interfere into the 
debate.60 
 Beyond their tacit support Turkish authorities often collaborated with Serbian četas 
(as they meant smaller danger for the Ottoman state), and never initiated attacks on Serbian 
paramilitary troops according to the account of the Bulgarian Ikonomov. Major Janusewski, 
Austro-Hungarian officer in Skopje also admitted to the Bulgarians, that Turks rather seemed 
to favour Serbs, than Bulgars. It was also Ikonomov, who reasoned this, when he gave a 
detailed account on Mahmud Shevket pasha’s opinion, expressed on February, 1908. 
According to the pasha only the Bulgarians (here the pasha meant the official Bulgaria) are 
responsible for the worsening of the situation in Macedonia: Bulgarians think, that the case 
of Macedonia is similar to that of Eastern Rumelia, but they are wrong, as the Macedonian 
question is an European diplomatic question.61 This enlightens the Turkish fears, that after 
the withdrawal of Powers from the provinces a similar and quick process will take place in 
Macedonia, as happened in Eastern Rumelia. 
Two parties were responsible for the local representation of Serbian interests in the 
Sanjak of Skopje: the Serbian National Club and the Constitutional Party. The differences 
between the views of the two organisations were not significant (the latter was more open 
towards the Ottoman government), the rivalry between them was based on the competition 
for financial sources. The debate on the distribution of financial support arriving from Serbia 
resulted in the division and opposition of villages as well. The two parties in Skopje and 
Kumanovo established local organizations and a skupština, which was the common organ of 
the Serbs in this sanjak. Based on Austro-Hungarian archival sources it seems, that contrary 
to their internal debates, the Serbian political organizations represented the Serb interests 
unanimously and unambiguously.62 
A cooperation between local Serbs and Young Turks has already been experienced 
during the elections of 1908.63 The Ottoman leadership of the sanjak used a peaceful tone 
towards local Serbs, although this tolerance did not mean the acceptance of the Serbian 
demands – sometimes Serbian leaders were also arrested, as everyone else, if the situation 
made it necessary.64 Very often the central power remained neutral in Serbo-Bulgarian 
conflicts, or tended to support Serb claims in religious or educational issues even contrary to 
laws.65 In return for their ignorance or negligence, Young Turks expected Serbian solidarity 
regarding the anti-Bulgarian measures initiated by the state.66 This was characteristic in the 
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whole Kosovo vilaet not only in the Sanjak of Skopje.67 A Young Turk–Serbian cooperation 
also existed regarding the oppression of Albanian cultural demands especially in the western 
and northern regions of the vilaet, where the proportion of Albanian population was 
greater.68  
 The leaders of the local Serbian communities did not increase their aspirations, their 
aim was to secure the results already gained through a peaceful coexistence with CUP. 
Young Turks did not hinder the work of the skupština in the beginning. But the recognition of 
the Serbian national community and cultural rights were still missing from the relationship.69 
Another Serbian desire was to appoint a Serbian metropolite to Debar-Veles diocese and to 
get official governmental support for the Serbian propaganda.70 So, the local Serbian policy 
was able to show its peaceful side as well to the new Ottoman government, but it did not 
resign or refrain from the usage of ’less peaceful non-parliamentary instruments’.71 
 Besides the moderate and relatively consolidated political relations between the 
Young Turks and Serbians, the debate about churches and schools produced more conflicts 
between Serbians and Bulgarians. The ecclesiastical conflict reached a new level in 1902, 
when a Serbian episcopate was established in the city of Skopje. The debate has been going 
on for years between patriarchists and exarchists for positions, institutions and souls, but 
the arrival of the new Serbian metropolite changed the situation and exacerbated the 
conflict,72 because a diocesis had to be detached from the Bulgarian episcopate, the 
churches and schools had to be redistributed, as well as his sphere of action had to be 
clarified.73 This was very important, as national propaganda only reached as far as the 
organisation of the national Church did. Debate was going on about the rights over the 14 
churches to be detached and on the right of the Serbian metropolite to establish new 
churches. The solution of the problem was hindered by the leaders of the vilaet as well: 
although they set up a committee to handle the question, but all the members of the 
committee were exarchists (Bulgarians), who opposed the Serbian wills, not to mention the 
hesitation of the local population that refused to be attached to a Serbian diocesis.  
The same reasons caused conflict regarding educational questions and schools, as 
these determined the national identity of the local communities.74 When the Serbian 
metropolite wanted to increase his influence over churches, he also wanted to extend it over 
schools. The Serbian metropolite wished to establish 28 new schools with the support of the 
province leadership in those kazas that witnessed the most bitter and bloodiest fights 
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between the Bulgarian and Serbian national propagandists (Kriva Palanka, Kumanovo, and in 
other territories of the vilaet: Tetovo, Gostivar).75 
Another peculiarity of the situation is, that beyond the antagonism with Bulgarians, 
the Serbian metropolite also had conflicts with Belgrade and with one of the Serbian parties 
concerning the authority over schools. This ended in a compromise, and the Serbian Minister 
of Education agreed to give back schools financed by the Serbian state to the Serbian 
Church. This meant, that teachers were also replaced, and the system of requirements 
became standardised once again. This enlightens two facts: 1, the Serbian consulate was 
unable to maintain the school system and 2, since 1909 the Ottoman government had 
hindered the establishment of national clubs, many public activities were able to survive 
only under the aegis of the Church.76  The conflict with the Constitutional Party was caused 
by the appeasement-policy of the latter, which was refused by the Serbian metropolite who 
supported the national club only. Villages under the dominance of the Constitutional Party 
were threatened by closing down the local schools.77  
 Beyond political and cultural demands, politicians tried to use economic instruments 
as well to improve Serbian positions by increasing the number of real estates in Serb hands. 
They decided to buy back lands formerly sold to Moslem owners, or lands of expelled 
Bulgarians, who could then never return. The needed financial support was given by the 
Serbian bank, Zadruga, that decided to establish 10 branch offices of savings banks in the 
Sanjak of Skopje. But as the approval of local Turkish authorities was missing, therefore the 
action was delayed.78  
The conciliatory and moderate Serbian policy towards the Young Turks was by no 
means accidental. After 1908, due to their relatively small proportion and due to the fruitful 
Bulgarian denominational and national propaganda, the position of the Serbian minority had 
significantly weakened in the sanjak. The most obvious sign of this trend was that many 
Pravoslav inhabitants and villages that were counted as 'Serbians' in the eye of the active 
members of the Serbian national movement, became 'Bulgarians'. According to the Austro-
Hungarian consulary reports, from 1909 on, the Serbian Voivodes in the sanjak and their 
irregular troops had committed more and more retributive murders in order to put an end 
to this tendency. The number of Serbian attacks against the 'Bulgarisierte Serben’ increased 
mainly in Kriva Palanka, Kumanovo and Veles kazas. These attacks naturally triggered 
counter-actions by the IMRO.79  
Concrete cases of hindering further Bulgarization were conscribed by Austro-
Hungarian and Bulgarian consuls.80 Serbian voivodes visited those villages, where the male 
population was working far away from their homeland (cases observed in Kriva Palanka, 
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Kumanovo and Skopje kaza) to exert pressure on the local dwellers. According to the 
Bulgarian ambassador in Belgrade the following settlements were the most exposed to such 
violent Serbian propaganda: Orlanci in Kumanovo kaza, Bigor-Dolenci, Gorno Dolenci, Dvorci 
from the region of Kičevo. Beyond the presence of Serbian četas another problem was 
caused by the harassment of those on pečalbarstvo, Macedonians working in Belgrade or in 
Pirot. These migrating Macedo-Slavs were threatened by the withdrawal of their earnings or 
by hindering their free return to their homeland, unless they claim themselves Serbs (not to 
mention the constant threat that irregular troops may invade into their homeland). These 
workers were often compelled to ask for a written oath from their community in which the 
whole family or the community declared its loyalty to Serbdom. Mihail Georgiev asked for 
such a paper from his brother in Dvorci.81 From village Orlanci more than 100 male persons 
were working in Belgrade by 1909. The Serbian government offered 3000 levas for their 
consent to open a Serbian school in Orlanci, and thus managed to get 68 supporters out of 
the 100.82 This clearly enlightens the ratio of success of tough Serbian propaganda (68%).  
Very often family-members turned against each other when they decided to adhere 
to a different national identity. The influence of national ideas was so strong, that personal 
decisions were able to destroy traditional family structures. The father of Theodosi Mihajlov, 
Mihail Kralev, a tailor in Kumanovo, was imprisoned due to his revolutionary and other 
wrongful (not political) activity, and was freed by amnesty in 1908. In order to restart his life 
and to educate his son he asked for material and financial support from the Bulgarian 
community in Kumanovo, but he was refused. After the refusal, he turned to the Serbomans 
in the same town, who gave him 10-15 Turkish lira (300 francs), and tasks also to promote 
Serbian propaganda. He accepted the conditions and soon he became totally Serbized. He 
decided, that his son, who was studying in a Bulgarian school, had to continue his studies in 
the Teachers Training College in Belgrade. Later in a četnik meeting he was advised to send 
his son into military school in Belgrade to become non-commissioned officer. His son refused 
to do so, and he asked for help from the Bulgarian consul in Belgrade, who promised him 
immunity and Bulgarian higher education in the Teachers’ Training College in Kjustendil, if he 
gave him a proper account on his father’s activity. According to the account of the son, the 
father was agitating in Pirot and Niš against Bulgarians, and forced/convinced Macedonian 
peasants searching for job to claim themselves Serbs, and sent them back to Orlanci and 
Orahovac (Kičevo) to agitate against Bulgaria. The father also eliminated Bulgarian agents, 
and informed Serbian police about private persons who were in correspondence with 
Bulgarians. For his activity he received monthly 80-100 francs (this equals with the monthly 
salary of a teacher in secondary schools). In this case both the necessity to subsist and the 
revenge against the former community (the Bulgarians), that refused to help, was a 
motivating factor.83  
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Violence decreased neither against the thin, but influential layer of intelligence: 
alongside with simple labourers, priests and teachers remained primary targets after 1908. 
In the spring of 1909 a Bulgarian teacher, Alexander Mankov was murdered in a Serbian raid 
(Rahovdol village, Veles kaza), and Alexandar, the Serbian teacher of Kozle (Skopje kaza, 
Zeleniko nahije) was also killed by Bulgarians in Novoselo. The Bulgarian Mane Miklarov, 
priest of Štip, was killed because he became a propagator of Serbian national ideas, while 
the sin of priest Aršov from Radibuš (kaza Kriva Palanka) was that he wanted to become 
Bulgarian. Even leaders of monasteries were convinced or bribed by money to change side. 
The igumen of the ortodox monastery in Stalkovce, who had earlier some debates with the 
local Bulgarian starešinas was offered a huge sum to claim himself Serbian. These methods 
were not specific and confined to the Sanjak of Skopje, the same events and methods 
occurred in elsewhere. 
Contrary to other sanjaks of Kosovo vilaet, in the Sanjak of Skopje Serb politicians 
tried to improve their positions against Bulgarians through the Albanian question.84 Since 
the CUP hesitated to fulfill the wishes of local Serbs, they tried to sharpen the tensions 
between Albanians and the CUP in this sanjak. It is noteworthy, that Albanian national clubs 
were often the organisational and supporting basis of CUP too, and the loss of Albanian 
sympathy could easily mean the shrinking of social layers supporting the CUP. The worsening 
of Albanian-Young Turk relationship was advantageous for the Serbs, as they thought, the 
CUP had to rely upon them after loosing the alliance of Moslem Albanians. The Serbs 
counted on the improvement of their negotiating positions through the escalation of 
Albanian-CUP tensions. That’s why the local Serb newspaper, the Vardar called the Albanians 
brethren in March, 1909 and supported their will to implement the Latin alphabet.85  
It seems, that official Serbia also tended to accept the regional interest of Serbs in 
Macedonia and did not want to pursuit a policy without or opposing to the will of local 
Serbs. The skupština in Belgrade decided to pay recompensation for the former Moslem 
landowners. This friendly act had a positive response among the Moslems in the Sanjak of 
Skopje, providing a sphere to manoeuvre for local Serbian politicians.86 Nevertheless, these 
’soft methods’ were rare. 
Regarding the 'less moderate' means, it was primarily the Belgrade government that 
played an active role.87 First, the number of band leaders arriving to the Sanjak of Skopje 
increased (in winter, 1909 it meant 28 bands), secondly the Serbian government wanted to 
improve the armament of irregular troops. One of the main target locations for the rifles, 
revolvers, explosives and ammunition arriving from Serbia was the Preševo-Gjilan-Kumanovo 
triangle, where the primary objective of Nikola Pašić’s government was to arm up the 
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Serbian population so they could defend themselves against Moslem attacks.88 According to 
the Austro-Hungarian consulate in Skopje it was the local Serbian consul’s responsibility to 
organise the transportation and distribution of weapons and to align the operation of the 
irregular troops. In order to make illegal weapon transportations more flexible, some 
Moslem officers of the police were bribed too.89 It is important to note, that Bulgarian 
villages also got weapon transportations and ammunitions from Bulgaria with the help of the 
Church and consulates.90 In Bulgarian villages local teachers (and perhaps priests and 
monks)91 were responsible for the storage and distribution of weapons,92 which affirms their 
significant role in reaching national goals. 
The realisation of Serb national aspirations were promoted by the fact, that beyond 
the religious and educational conflicts the local Bulgarian population had to face with the 
rivalry manifested in fights between the different wings of the IMRO (leftists and former 
vrhovists). Ottoman authorities were also burdened and engaged by the orthodox assaults 
on pomak villages along the border, and this also provided for a larger sphere of manoeuvre 
for Serbs.93  
Beyond the policy of official Serbia and the Macedonian Serb elite it is also worth 
analysing the survival strategies of the population at local level. We’ve already seen an 
example on individual level, in which son turned against father (Kralev-case). Here a 
Bulgarian example was chosen to analyse the behavior of local communities. 
Pusta-Bresnica is a small village located SW from Skopje, 5 hours walk from the 
sanjak center at the right bank of Vardar River in a mountainous area.94 In this ethnically 
heterogeneous area, this Bulgarian settlement was surrounded by the Albanian-populated 
Sveta Petka, the Serbophil Zdunje, and the mixed Bulgarian-Turkish Jablica. The inhabitants 
of Pusta Bresnica were working on the čiflik of Ahmad bey, who has not visited his tenants 
for 15-20 years, only two kehajas were arranging the issues concerning the land and tenants. 
Villagers were ordered to give them accomodation and food, but kehajas had no juridical 
power over the village.95 The inhabitants of the settlement had no land property, until the 
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bey offered them to buy his fields for 6000 Turkish lira – partly because of the problems 
mentioned earlier – which was bargained by the villagers to 4200 liras in three details. 
Villagers sold their draft animals and cut down woods to pay the price, but they were unable 
to settle the last 1000 liras (20 thousand francs). Villagers thought that the yearly tax was 
included in the price, but the bey refused to accept this condition. Therefore peasants asked 
for help from the Bulgarian state through the Bulgarian metropolite in Skopje. In their 
petition, villagers argued that Pusta Bresnica is the only Bulgarian village in the 
neighborhood, surrounded by settlements inhabited by other nations. The villagers 
emphasized the favourable geographical location of the settlement, as it was situated 
halfway between Kičevo (Poreč) and Skopje cutting communication lines between these two 
centers of Serbian agitation. As a drawback the settlement was under constant 
propagandistic siege of the Serbs.96 Decades earlier identity and ethnic differences had no 
significance here – at least not for the bey and not from agricultural aspects – but due to the 
growing propaganda the importance of differences increased, and commitment (even 
inclination) to a national identity imposed threats as well. But villagers thought, that time 
had come to profit from their national identity beyond the many inconveniences it had 
caused. Emphasizing its loyalty to Bulgaria the village wanted a reward for the former 
miseries: the population required land and school to become self-subsistent and educated, 
thus villagers applied for the financial support of the Bulgarian state to get the missing 1000 
liras. „There is a state, where patriotism is still alive, and it would be the sign of 
governmental wisdom to send the sum to the metropolite.” 97 In their application they drew 
the attention to the activity of the Serbian metropolite in Skopje, who tried to open a 
Serbian school at the settlement, but local people resisted up to now:98 „…Our village is a 
granite cliff, on which the Serbian propaganda always broke his neck up to now … local 
people always defended their Bulgarian identity, although it created only drawbacks and 
disadvantages for them”. 99 But Sofia refused to give financial aid on 6, Feb. 1909, referring 
to the laws. 100 This created a very unfavourable situation for the community, that had 
already begun the transaction and paid 2/3 of the total sum for the lands.  
The question is why the Bulgarian government decided not to support the village. 
Was it the reason, that the settlement was standing alone isolated, surrounded by villages of 
different ethnicity and the government found it hopeless and not cost-effective to support 
such a community? Was it the main problem, that Pusta-Bresnica was located in the conflict 
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zone, where the influence of Serbia and Bulgaria was nearly equal? Did the Bulgarian state 
refrain from supporting insignificant localities on the right bank of the Vardar? Were 
supporting activities focused mainly on towns? Did the Bulgarian government suspend its 
support after the revolution of the CUP? Or simply, was the sum to high? 
Perhaps all considerations were realistic, perhaps not. In 1907, when the church of 
Gostivar was violently taken away from the Bulgarian community, the Bulgarian government 
raised an objection, which means, that it was deeply concerned by events taken place on the 
other side of the Vardar.101 Had Pusta-Bresnica located in the safe zone of Bulgarian 
influence, it should have been more reasonable not to support it. Settlements located in the 
safe zone and situated in the ’contested zone’ got support at the same probability. The 
school of Gradec and Gorno Vodno on the right bank of the Vardar River got 350 levas from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9, April, 1908, while Smilovci on the left bank got 600 levas 
on 13, November, 1908, throught the National Bank.102 Of course we do not know whether 
these sums were spent on educational purposes or simply covered the transportation and 
distribution of weapons. Nevertheless, the 20 thousand levas mentioned in the case of Pusta 
Bresnica seemed to be too high, but just one year ago the Bulgarian metropolite in Skopje 
got a similarly huge amount of money (6-7 thousand levas) for educational purposes – 
nevertheless there had been more pupils than in Pusta Bresnica.103  Was the reason of 
refusal, that Sofia supported mainly ideological goals (churches, schools) and buying land 
was not among the supported activities? Maybe. But the villagers of Pusta Bresnica asked 
the money for purchasing land and establishing a school. Or the ambivalent rhetoric 
exaggerations of the application (school question, insignificance of location) became too 
obvious for the Bulgarian officials reading the document? Pusta Bresnica was located on the 
top of a mountain ridge, and effectively could not disturb the connection between the Serbs 
of Skopje and Poreč as villagers originally claimed.  
Neither urban communities were always lucky to be supported. Even in Skopje the 
Bulgarian metropolite had to reason thoroughly, why he asked for financial support of the 
Bulgarian state, when he wanted to establish a new church in Čair Mahala, a precinct of 
Skopje. Although the Sultan gave a ferman which allowed the Bulgarian community to build 
a new exarchist church, he did not allot financial support, and up to 1911 the required sum 
was not collected from local supporters. The first main argument of the metropolite was that 
the church would be located in the outskirts of the city, therefore many villagers entering 
the town would use it and thus would become influenced by Bulgarian ideology. He astutely 
mentioned that the Serbs had offered financial aid, but the community had refused (that is 
some kind of blackmailing of the state, while empasizing the loyalty of the population). And 
the last reason: if the church in the outskirts remains unfinished, the population would visit 
the church in Tophane Mahala, which is exposed to Serbian propaganda - since the other 
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exarchist church in the city centre is far away from Čair Mahala.
the tactics of local communities as well.
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The revolution of CUP, and soon the disappointment from the above analysed policy of 
Young Turks created a high-time for destruction. When in 1907 Serb bands around Štip and 
Kočani received 300 000 francs to promote the Serbization of villagers, this sum was not 
spent on purchasing land, erecting schools, as we have already mentioned, but on bribing or 
intimidating influential local people, and purchasing guns.105 If the loyalty of a village could 
be bought by 20 thousand francs/leva106 (it equals with the yearly grain-income of 20-30 
peasants with 5 hectares of arable land, or with the salary of 20 officials, or with the yearly 
payment of 6 lieutenants), then the Serbs could buy 15 villages from the mentioned sum, 
which is not decisive regarding the power relations. Instead of doing this the Serbs decided 
to create self-supporting četas (buying weapons, kidnapping people, requisiting sheep, etc.) 
by relying on the financial aid of the Serbian state. Under these circumstances it would have 
been a futile effort to maintain the old-fashioned support system for the Bulgarian 
government. 
*** 
During 1911, the internal crisis of the Ottoman Empire deepened further. The reports 
of the Austro-Hungarian consuls focused almost only on violent acts. In May, 1912 at least 4 
Serbian četas arrived to the territory of the Sanjak of Skopje from Vranje.107 Irregular 
Bulgarian troops enhanced their activity against state property and officials, paralyzing 
communication lines and infrastructure (post offices, banks, railroad, etc.).108 State officials 
were unable to defend themselves, military forces were also under constant harassment. 
The authorities were so demoralised (partly because of being unpaid for months), that bands 
could appear in the center of towns in groups, with weapons even by daylight. At night local 
inhabitants refrained from staying on the streets, only the gendarmerie and military troops 
were in patrol, often clashing with infiltrating paramilitary units.109  
The Serb political groups - unlike četa members - tried to maintain good relations 
with the authorities,110 while Serbian bands were engaging into ethnic cleansing along the 
border, targeting Bulgarian priests. Assaults became more and more brutal. A četa 
numbering more than a hundred members expelled Exarchist/Bulgarian monks from Karpina 
monastery.111 Contrary to the fact, that Serbian-Bulgarian negotiations on diplomatic 
cooperation and military alliance (the Balkan League) were rumoured,112 along the border a 
’bellum omnium contra omnes’ was about to evolve: Bulgarian, Serbian and Ottoman bands 
and military forces were fighting against each other, destroying harvest, pillaging villages 
                                                 
105
 ЦДА, ф. 335. oп. 1. a.e. 396. л. 5-6. 
106
 The sum that Pusta-Breznica asked for. 
107
 Ivan Babunski and 14 men were around Veles, Stojčo vojvoda was Skopska Crna Gora, Todor Algunski - 
formerly teacher in Kumanovo – „visited” his hometown, while the četa of Boško vojvoda turned against Prilep. 
ЦДА, f. 331k. oп. 1. a.e. 367. л. 6. 
108
 ÖHHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Franz Kolossa, 04.06.1911., No.26/pol, 2. 
109
 ÖHHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 22.11.1911., No.58/pol, 4. 
110
 „Die Serben aber zeigten den Türken gegenüber [...] viel Rücksicht und Zurückhaltung – ich möchte fast 
sagen Freundschaft.“ ÖHHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 05.02.1911., No.6/pol, 12. 
111
 ÖHHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 05.02.1911., No.6/pol, 12. 
112
 Austrian consuls also came to know this (but not the conditions of cooperation): ÖHHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, 
Heimroth to Pallavicini, 05.02.1911., No.6/pol, 12. 
considered as hideouts,113 intimidating the local population considered as a reserve for 
Bulgarian troops.114  
 The population was deprived, demoralised – villagers quit complaining on evil-doers 
at the authorities, because they feared of immediate punishment, and violence that raged 
across the land has also paralyzed the courage of authorities.115 Even the Bulgarian 
government had officially declared already in January, 1912 that it was unable to hinder the 
activity of Bulgarian bands any more.116 Grown men would rather become četa members to 
pursuit everyday violence, than to suffer from it. This general tendency was catalysed by the 
disarmamament action of the military forces in the previous years: if villagers wanted to 
defend themselves, they had to join a band, since there were no weapons at home any 
more. Another type of reaction was of Albanians’, unleashing a revolt in each year after 
1910. Their activity became more and more ethnicized and by the end of 1911 it evolved to a 
national movement irrespective of denominational differences among Albanians. The major 
cohesive force of these multi-religious groups was the cultural demand regarding 
educational and official emancipation of Albanian language and the demand of territorial 
autonomy. 
The vali, Hadi pasha personally visited the main center of crisis leading a loyal army 
to punish atrocities. He did not make distinction between Christians and Moslems. But 
violent instruments, executions and arrestments could not bring relief any more. As a result 
of a conflict in January, 1911, in Štip kaza 76 Bulgarians were punished: 6 were condemned 
to death, many were sentenced to lifetime imprisonment.117 By the end of 1911 the 
situation has worsened in some kazas so much, that even the vali did not dare enter. 
(Kratovo, Štip, Veles!).118  
The units of gendarmerie and military forces were in constant motion, but were 
unable to engage into battle with the guerillas. Minor weapon storages were eliminated, 
some assaults were hindered, but troops were unable to pacify the territory.119 Due to the 
pressure, the reliability of officers and enrolled privates was questioned. The demoralization 
of Ottoman forces is indicated by the fact, that between June and December 1911 Bulgaria 
gave shelter for more than 20 soldiers deserting the army. Not only Macedo-Bulgarians, but 
also Anatolian Christians (2), Rumelian (6) and even Anatolian Moslems crossed the 
border.120 The leaders of the sanjak and vilaet gave up their last forlorn hope to settle the 
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questions, when the most reliable nizam units of the province were sent to Jemen to put 
down the rebellion there.121 The agony of central power was aborted by the outbreak of 
Balkan Wars. 
 
Summarising the above mentioned events we can draw the conclusions that  
• the borders between the different types of violent actions triggered either by 
ecclesiastical and school conflicts or customs law gradually faded; 
• the supporting policy of small states has irreversibly shifted from construction to 
destruction;  
• the activity of the irregular troops was limited only by the change of seasons 
(neither Ottoman authorities, nor the withdrawal of support could stop them any 
more; 
• četas became highly organised and self-subsistent groups by getting involved in 
agriculture (opium, tobacco, smuggling) or by expropriating state and private 
properties; 
• beyond troops pursuiting the national ideas, ethnically and religiously mixed 
mercenary bands also subsisted and were applied;  
• the representatives of the state did not even attempt to handle the economic and 
political problems. Their violent and intolerant interference, contrary to the 
temporary successes, hastened the escalation of conflicts into anarchy;  
• the ’usual’ social conflicts (between public officers and citizens, security forces and 
inhabitants etc.) also got out of control,
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 and were overshadowed by the new 
types of conflicts; 
• the nationalistic movements declared total warfare in which – compared to the 
years prior to 1903 – not only the Ottoman administration or military forces and 
the active members of the movements (ideologists, like teachers, priests) were 
considered as targets, but passive masses also, as they could provide shelter, 
information, ammunition, economic base for the rivals; 
• the economy has collapsed by 1912 – fields remained uncultivated due to the 
violence wave, which triggered emigration. 
On the eve of the First Balkan War there was no functioning state administration and 
economy in the sanjak of Skopje. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
a.e. 435. Deserters were mainly privates of 18-26 years. In this archival unit only one Bulgarian soldier, Sakir 
Sabanov, a Moslem of origin from Radomir deserted to Turkey.  
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